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16.1  Labor Divided 
American  workers  have  never  formed class-wide  institutions  like  those 
found in the labor movements of other western countries. Instead, America’s 
working class is fragmented, leading to wide wage differentials in different 
industries and occupations.  Since at least  1900, wage differentials between 
skilled  and unskilled  workers  have been  significantly  greater in the  United 
States than in Europe.’ Workers in construction crafts especially have enjoyed 
a  wide  premium  over other workers.  From  their  privileged  position  they 
formed the backbone of a conservative American trade union movement that 
fought hard to defend their privileges against the rest of the labor force as well 
as against their employers. 
Some have attributed sharp divisions among American workers to exoge- 
nous conditions, including ethnic and racial distinctions.* Such an interpreta- 
tion fails as a historical explanation, however, because it assumes unchanging 
characteristics  and  attitudes.  It  cannot,  therefore,  explain  variations  in 
working-class solidarity such as the rise and precipitous decline in organized 
labor solidarity in the  1880~.~  I take a different approach. Instead of treating 
divisions as exogenously determined, I argue that divisions were fostered by 
The author is grateful to Claudia Goldin, Stanley Engerman, Ken Fones-Wolf, Debra Jacobson, 
Sandy Jacoby, Robert Margo, Jeffrey Williamson, and seminar participants at the University of 
Pennsylvania and the  1988 ASSA meetings for comments.  Research was supported by  a grant 
from the German Marshall Fund of the United States. 
1. Henry Phelps-Brown, The Inequality of  Pay (Berkeley, 1977), p. 73. 
2. See, for example, Seymour Martin Lipset, “Radicalism or Reformism: The Sources of Work- 
ing Class Protest,” American Political  Science Review,  77 (Mar.  1983), pp.  1-18;  Gwendolyn 
Mink, Old Labor and New Immigrants in American Political Development (Ithaca, 1986). 
3. See, for example, Eric Foner, “Why Is There No Socialism in America?’ History Workshop, 
17 (Spring  1984), pp.  57-80;  Richard J.  Oestreicher, Solidarity  and Fragmentation:  Working 
People and Class Consciousness in Detroit, 1875-1900  (Urbana,  1986). 
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politicians who sought to undermine working-class challenges to their power. 
Using the example of construction workers around 1900, I argue that the ex- 
traordinarily  large wage differential they received in big cities was fueled by a 
strategy pursued  by urban political  machines to head off radical labor move- 
ments  by  promoting  urban  public  works,  thereby  cultivating  allies among 
construction craft unions. 
16.2  Levels and Determinants of  Wage Differentials 
Big-city construction workers were paid wages far beyond those of workers 
in other industries or in smaller towns. To  measure the effect of city size on 
wages, I have estimated regressions of  the average wage paid to workers in 
different  occupations  in  a locality  using  data from the  1904 Report  of  the 
Commissioner  of Labor.4 In addition to industry and regional  dummy vari- 
ables,  I include  variables  designed  to control for supply- and demand-side 
influences on wages: the proportion of immigrants and blacks in the popula- 
tion, the locality’s rate of  population growth, and a city cost of  living index 
for 1890.5 
In a labor market free of  distortions, labor mobility  should equalize real 
wages  within  an occupation  across regions.6 After controlling for industry, 
ethnicity, race, establishment  size, and prices,  city size should measure the 
residual impact of urban disamenities and political  influences on wages. As- 
suming that a worker’s industry and skill are not associated with preferences 
for city living, the interaction of city population with skill and industry vari- 
ables tests whether the impact of urban politics on wages differed in the con- 
struction and manufacturing sectors, and for skilled and unskilled workers. 
The regressions are all highly significant and demonstrate that even within 
an  increasingly  efficient national  labor market,  big-city  construction had  a 
special place in the  American  working class.  As others have found, wages 
were higher in the West and lower in the South than in the Northeast or Mid- 
west. Regional differentials, however, were largely due to the smaller size of 
4.  U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, Nineteenth Annual Report of  the Commissioner 
oflabor, 1904: Wages and Hours ofLabor (Washington, D.C., 1905). 
5.  City population characteristics are from the U.S. Census Office, Eleventh Census, 1890: 
Popularion (Washington, D.C.,  1895). vol.  I, part  I,  pp.  524-58;  U.S. Census Office, 7‘werfth 
Census of  the United States, 1900: Census of Population (Washington, D.C., 1901). vol.  1, part 
I, pp. 609-94.  Price data are from Michael Haines, “A State and Local Consumer Price Index for 
the United  States in  1890,” National Bureau of  Economic Research,  Working Paper Series on 
Historical Factors in Long Run Growth, no. 2 (May 1989). Because price data are available for 
only about half of the cities, real wage regressions have only been estimated for a subset of  the 
observations. 
While not reported directly, establishment size can be calculated from the data and are included 
in the regressions to test the impact of different production technologies on wages. 
6. Real wage differentials will persist in efficient markets to compensate workers for living in 
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southern and western cities and to higher prices in the West. After controlling 
for city size, nominal wages were only 10 percent lower in the South than in 
the Northeast in  1890, and southern wages almost reached northern levels in 
1903. Wages were higher in the western states even after controlling for city 
size, but nearly half of the 30 percent nominal wage differential between the 
West and the Northeast was due to differences in the cost of living. Comparing 
the results for 1890 with those for 1903, wage differentials narrowed sharply 
for both the South and West. This may suggest the emergence of a national 
labor market.’ 
Other evidence also suggests that labor markets functioned efficiently. Ap- 
parently, laborers responded to fluctuations in regional labor demand by mov- 
ing to high-wage localities. The highest wages were paid in the fastest grow- 
ing cities, and  there  is little evidence that cultural or historical  factors led 
immigrants or blacks to crowd into low-wage cities.8 Every ten-percentage- 
point increase in the proportion of foreign-born residents is associated with an 
increase in both nominal and real wages of  over 3 percent in both  1890 and 
1903. 
All workers received higher wages in big cities. The effect of  city size on 
wages was much greater in construction  than it was in manufa~turing.~  For 
skilled manufacturing workers, nominal wages increased by around 3 percent 
with every doubling in city size. Wages increased  faster for unskilled manu- 
facturing workers,  rising by 6 to 7 percent with every doubling in city size. 
Going from a town of 4,000 to a city of a million reduced the manufacturing 
skill premium by twenty percentage points. 
Construction  workers  in  large  cities  enjoyed  wages  higher  than  those 
earned by workers in other industries or by small-town construction workers. 
Despite widespread  labor migration,  the wage  structure of  small cities and 
towns was significantly different from that in large cities, and the differences 
persisted  from  1890 to 1903. Skilled construction workers’ wages increased 
much faster with city size than did those of skilled manufacturing workers, 
rising by about 10 percent for every doubling in city size. As a result, they 
7. Joshua L. Rosenbloom, “One Market or Many? Labor Market Integration in the Late Nine- 
teenth-Century United States,” Journal ofEconomic History,  50 (Mar. 1990), pp. 85-108;  Lonny 
Wilson, “Intercity Wage and Cost of Living Differentials in the United States, 1889-1939 (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Iowa, 1973). 
8. In these reduced-form wage equations, there is no separate control for labor mobility. As a 
result,  the regression coefficients confound the depressing effect of immigration and increased 
labor supply on wages and the positive effect of  high wages on labor mobility. The coefficients are 
the net result of  these two effects. On balance, they indicate that the effect of wages on migration 
was greater than any depressing effect of exogenous migration on wages because wages were 
higher in cities with a high proportion of foreign-born residents. Wages also increased with the 
proportion of nonwhite residents in a city. 
9. In his dissertation,  Lonny Wilson finds that nominal earnings increased by 5 percent with 
every doubling in city size in  1890 and by  over 4 percent in  1900. He also presents evidence 
suggesting that these differences were much greater than the price differentials between small and 
large cities; see Wilson, “Intercity Wage Differentials,” pp.  103, 125. 450  Gerald Friedman 
earned 50 percent more in cities of a million than in towns of 4,000, gaining 
30 percent on skilled manufacturing workers. lo 
Labor market  distortions  are even  more striking  in markets for common 
labor. Despite an absence of specialized skills, laborers employed in big-city 
construction earned much more than those employed in small cities, and they 
earned more than laborers in big-city manufacturing. While going from a city 
of 4,000 to one of a million raised unskilled manufacturing wages by 35 per- 
cent, day laborers and hod carriers working on construction jobs in cities of a 
million  earned 50 percent more than their counterparts in towns of  4,000." 
Skilled and unskilled construction workers in big cities apparently worked in 
a labor market separated both  from their small town counterparts and from 
other unskilled workers in big cities. 
It is unlikely that high urban construction wages reflect compensation for 
urban  disamenities.  Only  disamenities  specific  to  urban  construction  jobs 
could explain the wide premium urban construction workers earned over other 
urban workers.'2 Urban construction workers also enjoyed at least one partic- 
ularly  favorable  nonwage job condition  beyond  their high  wages: they  led 
others in winning shorter hours.I3  Every doubling in city size was associated 
with a reduction in the construction  workweek of  nearly two hours in  1890 
and of over thirty minutes in 1903.14 
Urban construction workers may have been paid more to compensate for a 
relatively  long  trip  to work.  Unlike  manufacturing,  whose  workers  could 
move closer to a fixed work site, construction work is carried out at different 
sites over the year. The geographic spread of many large cities may have in- 
10. This is in nominal terms; after adjusting for cost of living differentials, real wages for skilled 
construction workers rise by  60 to 70 percent while those of skilled manufacturing workers rise 
by  10 to 15 percent. 
11. Hod carriers are laborers employed in carrying bricks and other materials to bricklayers and 
other craftsmen working on construction jobs. 
12. Disamenities common to all workers, such as urban crowding and mortality, would raise all 
wages without producing an extra premia for construction workers. 
13. American unions struggled for decades to reduce the workweek. In 1886 the AFL inaugu- 
rated the tradition of striking on May Day by  calling a general strike for the eight-hour day. The 
AFL continued this campaign in I890 with the carpenters' union taking the lead. 
14. This is from a regression for the length of the workweek similar to the wage regressions in 
Table 16.1. Note that hours declined with city size even faster for skilled than for unskilled con- 
struction workers. 
Urban construction workers probably suffered less unemployment than did other construction 
workers. In New York, for example, unemployment rates for union members in  1898 and I899 
are nearly identical for construction workers in New York City as those in the rest of the state. At 
a seasonal unemployment peak, in December 1898, 35.7 percent of New York City's unionized 
construction workers were unemployed compared with 33.4  percent in the rest of the state; while 
in September  1899, 4.3 percent of the city's  unionized construction workers were unemployed 
compared with  5.2 percent elsewhere. See New  York  Bureau of  Labor Statistics, Seventeenth 
Annual Report, 1899 (Albany, 1900), pp.  32-36.  In addition, as Alexander Keyssar observes, 
urban workers may have been more successful in finding alternative employments during con- 
struction downturns than their counterparts in smaller locales because cities'  diverse economies 
insulate workers from the effects of downturns in individual industries. See Keyssar, Out of  Work: 
The First Centuv  of  Unemployment in Massachusetts (Cambridge, Mass., 19861, p. 119. 451  Urban Politics and Big-City Construction 
Table 16.1  Explaining the (Log) Real Wage by  Occupation and Locality, 1890 and 1903 
Variable 
1890  1903 
Wage  Real Wage  Wage  Real Wage 
Constant 
Log of  city population 
Population growth rate,  189G 
% Nonwhite 





Log of population x unskilled 
Log of  population  X  unskilled 
Log of population  X  skilled 
Construction 
Construction  X  skilled 
Wood and furniture 
Printing 
Log of establishment size 
Number of observations 
F-statistic 
R2 







































-  0.847 
0.061 
0.569* 















































Notes: The regressions are ordinary least squares, weighted by the number of employees in the occupa- 
tion and locality. There are fewer observations in the real wage than  in  the nominal wage regressions 
because price data are available only for a subset of cities. 
Sources: The average wage in occupation in localities is reported in the U.S. Commissioner of  Labor, 
Nineteenth Annual Report: Wages and Hours of  Labor (Washington, D.C., 1905). City characteristics 
are from the U.S. Census Office, Eleventh Census, 1890: Population (Washington, D.C., 1895), vol. 1, 
part 1, pp. 524-58;  U.S. Census Office, Twelfth Census, 1900: Population (Washington, D.C., 1901), 
vol.  I, part  1, pp. 609-94.  Price data are from Michael Haines, “A State and Local Consumer Price 
Index for the United States in  1890,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper Series on 
Historical Factors in Long Run Growth, no. 2 (May 1989). 
*Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 10% level. 
creased construction workers’ commuting time.  l5 However, this effect is prob- 
ably small. While workers may have changed job sites, most urban construc- 
tion  was  carried out in relatively  compact downtown  business  districts.  In 
addition, intraurban  transit  improved  substantially  during the period.  If  the 
15. Although the increase in commuting time would be balanced by urban construction work- 
ers’ shorter workday. 452  Gerald Friedman 
wage premium  urban  construction  workers received  in  1890 reflected com- 
pensation for commuting, then transit improvements should have lowered the 
premium by 1903. 
Differences in technology might have contributed to big-city  construction 
workers’ high wages. EntrepGts for continental and even world trade, big cit- 
ies  were  relatively  inhospitable  to  monopolies  in  manufacturing  products. 
Competition pushed big-city manufacturers to use the most advanced technol- 
ogies available, carrying out production in relatively large, modem establish- 
ments.16 As David Gordon, Richard Edwards,  and Michael Reich have ar- 
gued, technological  progress in urban  manufacturers may  have reduced  the 
demand for skilled manufacturing workers, lowering their wage.” This is in 
contrast with construction where the slow pace of technological  change pro- 
tected traditional crafts from competition with the unskilled. 
By itself, however, a demand-side, technology-driven account cannot ex- 
plain the effect of city size on wages. Without barriers blocking the movement 
of labor into urban construction,  a slow rate of technological  progress  does 
not explain the relative increase in wages for unskilled construction workers 
in  large cities.  Instead, with efficient labor markets,  changing technologies 
should change economy-wide relative wages without having any lasting im- 
pact on local wage patterns. Certainly over the thirteen years considered here, 
the flow of labor out of low-demand and low-wage towns toward high-demand 
and high-wage big cities could be expected to equalize occupational wages 
between localities. To  explain the persistence of regional wage differentials, a 
demand-side model of regional wage differentials must be complemented by 
an explanation for labor market rigidities. 
Strong unions supported high urban construction wages, and their member- 
ship and apprenticeship  restrictions provided  one important barrier to entry 
into urban  construction  labor  markets.18 Big-city  construction  unions  sup- 
ported  national  union  federations  to spread organization to small towns  to 
maintain high urban wages.I9 In addition to working to raise wages in small 
towns and cities, these unions discouraged workers from seeking urban jobs 
by publicizing news of strikes and any unfavorable labor market conditions in 
big cities. 
Unions raised  urban construction  wages,  but outside of  the largest cities 
16. Establishments in large cities were larger than their small-town counterparts. The number 
of workers per establishment increases by about 40 percent for every doubling in city size. 
17. David Gordon, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich, Segmented Work, Divided Workers 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1982). pp. 100-164. 
18. Even unskilled urban construction workers would have benefited from unionization because 
they had  among the few  functioning unions of  common laborers.  Note that almost all of  the 
unionized building laborers were in a few large cities. In New York, for example, 93 percent of 
the unionized building laborers in  1899 lived in New York City, compared with 70 percent of the 
nonlaborers (New York BLS, AnnualReporr, 1899, pp. 64-67). 
19. See, for example, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, The Carpenter (Aug. 
1881),  p. 2. 453  Urban Politics and Big-City Construction 
their effect was probably small. Wages were only 3 to 5 percent higher in cities 
and trades with a union local. Including a dummy variable for the presence of 
a union  does not  significantly reduce  the  independent effect of  city  size.*O 
Unions  may  have had  a larger influence on wages in big-city  construction, 
because there the unions were among the nation’s strongest. Between  1881 
and  1894, for example, strike success rates are significantly higher for con- 
struction workers in big cities than for workers in other industries or for con- 
struction workers in smaller towns and cities (see Table 16.2).*l Perhaps re- 
flecting their ability to conduct effective strikes, big-city construction unions 
enrolled a relatively  large proportion of the potential workforce. The union- 
ization rate of the entire labor force for the four largest construction trades in 
Chicago in  1902, for example, was 47 percent including 69 percent for car- 
penters and 68 percent for bricklayers.22 In contrast, the unionization  rate in 
the same four crafts in Illinois outside of Chicago was only 7 percent.23 
Unions formed within the manufacturing sector were also stronger in big 
cities than in rural areas, but city size had less of an impact in manufacturing 
than  in  construction.  In  contrast  with  construction  strikes,  there  is only  a 
small,  statistically insignificant positive  relationship between  strike success 
and city size in manufacturing.  Perhaps as a result, there is only a weak rela- 
tionship between city size and unionization rates. In Illinois in  1902, for ex- 
ample, unionization rates were higher in Chicago than in the rest of the state 
for all of  eight  large nonconstruction  trades,  but few workers belonged  to 
unions even in Chicago, and the difference between Chicago and the rest of 
the state is often  Only 15 percent of  Chicago machinists, for example, 
belonged to unions compared with 13 percent of those outside of Chicago. In 
20. This is from regressions similar to those in Table 16.1 including only occupations for which 
I have local union information: bricklayers,  carpenters, machinists, and molders. The estimate 
given is the coefficient on a dummy variable for the existence of a union local in the trade and 
locality. 
21. Data are not available for individual strikes in other years. For a more detailed discussion 
of these data, see Gerald Friedman, “Strike Success and Union Ideology: The United States and 
France, 1880-1914,” Journal ofEconornic History,  48 (Mar. 1988), pp. 1-25. 
22. The unionization rate for the same crafts in New York City in 1900 is only 27 percent. Some 
of the difference in unionization rates between New York and Illinois reflects the rapid growth of 
unions in both states between 1900 and 1902. Note, however, that these rates are below the union- 
ization rate of wage earners because the denominator, the entire labor force, includes employers. 
Also,  the unions’ reach exceeded their formal membership because many nonmembers would 
regularly support union strikes and wage demands without paying dues. 
The labor force data are from the U.S. Census Office, Twelfth  Census of the United Statrs, 
/900:CensusofPopulation(Washington,  D.C., 1901),v. 2,pt. 2,pp. 558-61.578-81,  New York 
union membership in September 1900 is from New York Bureau of  Labor Statistics, Eighternth 
Annual Report, 1900 (Albany, 1901). pp. 505-44.  Illinois membership in  1902 is from Illinois 
Bureau of  Labor Statistics, Twelfth Biennial Report, 1902 (Springfield, 1904). pp. 299-31  I. 
23. The gap between the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan unionization rates in New York is 
smaller, 27 percent for New York  City compared with  17 percent for the rest of the state. The 
number of  nonmetropolitan  union members and the size of  the labor force are from the same 
sources as in fn. 22. 
24. These crafts include machinists, printers, boot and shoe makers, tailors and garment work- 
ers, bakers, butchers, brewers, and coopers. 454  Gerald Friedman 
Table 16.2  Determinants of Strike Success in the United States: 
Strikes in 625 Cities, 1881-1894 
Variable  Mean  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Constant 
Union strike, 188 1-94 
Union strike, 1887-94 
Log of city population,  1880 
Construction industry  X  log of city 
Construction industry  x  union strike 
Construction industry  X  union strike, 
City percentage of foreign born, 1880 
Strike participation rate 
Log of  strike size 
Log of  establishment size 
Striker rate in industry and state 
Number of  issue dummy variables: 4 
Number of  industry dummy variables: 3 
Number of  year dummy variables:  13 
Chi-square statistic 
Mean of dependent variable 
Number of observations (individual strikes) 
population 
1887-94 
1  .oo  -0.155 
0.71  0.163 
0.41  0.490 
12.21  0.056 
3.03  0.235 
0. I9  -  1.050 
0.15  1.049 
0.51  0.038 
0.60  0.739 
3.54  0.001 
3.99  -0.701 














-  1.02 
1.15 
Notes: The estimating procedure is a logit where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to  1 
for strikes where the workers gain at least some of  their demands and equal to 0 otherwise. The 
industry dummy variables include construction, transportation,  and mining.  The dummy vari- 
ables for strike issues include dummy variables for strikes over work rules, strikes against wage 
cuts, strikes over the hours of  work, and strikes over personnel policies. 
Sources: Samples of  individual  strike  records in  U.S. Commissioner  of  Labor,  Third Annual 
Report: Strikes and Lockouts (Washington, D.C., 1888); and Tenth Annual Report: Strikes and 
Lockouts (Washington, D.C., 1895). Only strikes in the 625 largest American cities are included. 
City characteristics are from U.S. Census Office, Statistics  of  the Population ofthe U.S. at the 
Tenth Census, 1880 (Washington, D.C., 1886). vol.  I, pp. 447-56. 
New York, any positive effect of city size on unionization  is even smaller. In 
five of these same eight crafts, unionization rates are higher outside New York 
City  than  within,  including  machinists,  boot  and  shoe makers,  butchers, 
brewers, and coopers.25 
The impact of  city size on unionization in construction and in manufactur- 
ing can be explored further using data on the distribution of union locals for 
several American unions.  Data have been collected on the location of  union 
locals in December 1903 for four of the most important American unions: in 
construction,  the  United  Brotherhood  of  Carpenters  and  Joiners  and  the 
United Bricklayers and Masons, and in the metal trades, the International As- 
25.  There is a substantially higher unionization  rate  in  New  York  City among printers  (51 
percent vs. 32 percent outside the city) and’among garment workers (16 percent vs. 8 percent). 
The unionization rate among bakers is nearly the same in  the city (15 percent) as outside (14 
percent). 455  Urban Politics and Big-City Construction 
sociation of Machinists and the International Iron Molders Union.26  In Table 
16.3, I report the results of logit regressions for the effect of city size on the 
probability  that  a union  local  will  exist for each trade  in the  1,884 largest 
American cities.  In each case, city size is associated with a significant in- 
crease in the probability that there will be a union local in a city. But the effect 
of city size on the probability of having a union is significantly larger for the 
construction trades than for the  Big cities were the centers of  craft 
organization around 1900, especially for construction workers. 
The relative strength of urban unions might surprise both economic theo- 
rists and labor historians. Theorists might expect workers in smaller towns to 
be more successful in forming unions because it should be easier to mobilize 
a  smaller  number  of  workers  for collective  action  and  because  a  smaller 
town’s relative isolation should insulate local monopolies from outside com- 
petition.28 Prominent  labor historians,  such as Herbert Gutman, also argue 
that labor militancy was more effective in smaller locales. Gutman, for ex- 
ample, finds evidence that collective action by workers in smaller communi- 
ties  often  succeeded  because  the  workers  were  supported  by  many  in  the 
middle classes sympathetic to their struggles against outside  corporation^.^^ 
These arguments  underestimate,  however,  the importance of  the political 
leverage  enjoyed  by  big-city  workers.  Construction  workers  in  several  of 
America’s largest cities especially benefited from alliances formed with polit- 
ical machines after 1886. These alliances allowed urban construction workers 
to use municipal police powers, including licensing and other regulatory au- 
thority, to isolate themselves from national  labor markets.  While such alli- 
ances were of little value to manufacturing workers facing national markets in 
products as well as in labor, they helped construction workers to gain higher 
wages. These gains came, however, at the expense of separating urban con- 
struction workers from the rest of the working class. 
16.3  Big-City Politics and the Building Ikades 
By the late nineteenth century, political machines were the strongest politi- 
cal force in most large American cities.30 Unlike working-class  socialists or 
middle-class good government reformers, machines formed cross-class coali- 
26. The distribution of  union locals is available from the following union newspapers: United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, The Carpenter (Dec.  1903); the United Bricklayers and 
Masons, The Bricklayer and Mason (Dec. 1903); the International Iron Molders’ Union, The Iron 
Molders’  Journal  (Dec.  1903); and  the International  Association  of  Machinists,  Machinists’ 
Monthly Journal (Dec. 1903). 
27. The differences in the coefficients between the carpenters or masons and the machinists or 
molders are significant at 99 percent confidence with t-ratios of about 4. 
28. See, for example, Mancur Olson, The Logic of  Collective Action: Public Goods and the 
Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass., 1966). 
29. See, for example, Herbert Gutman, Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America 
(New York, 1976). 
30. M. Craig Brown and Charles N. Halaby, “Machine Politics in America, 1870-1945,” Jour- 
nal of  Interdisciplinary History, 17 (Winter 1987), pp. 587-612. 456  Gerald Friedman 
Table 16.3  Determinants of the Presence of a Union Local among the 1,884 
Largest American Cities, 1903 
Variable  Carpenters  Bricklayers  Machinists  Molders 
Constant 
Log of city population 





Mean of the dependent 
Log-likelihood ratio 
Number of observa- 
variable 
tions (cities) 
-  18.63* 
2.17* 
-  2.95* 
0.03 
-  0.08 
0.35* 




-  19.56* 
2.19* 








-  17.03*  -  16.89* 
1.77* 
-  2.10*  -3.08* 
-  2.00**  -4.33* 
1.22*  0.11 
0.83*  0.13 
0.79*  -  0.83** 
0.25  0.17 
-  741.39  -  583.45 
1,884  1,884 
Note: The estimating procedure is a logit where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 for 
cities with a union local and equal to 0 otherwise. 
Sources: Data on the location of union locals are from the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and 
Joiners,  The Carpenter (Dec.  1903); the United Bricklayers and  Masons, The Bricklayer  and 
Mason  (Dec.  1903); the International Iron Molders’ Union,  The Iron Molders’ Journal  (Dec. 
1903); the International Association of  Machinists, Machinists’ Monthly Journal  (Dec. 1903). 
Census characteristics of cities are from U.S. Census Office, Twelfth Census, 1900: Population 
(Washington, D.C., 1901),  vol. I, part  1, pp. 609-46. 
*Significant at the 1  % level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
tions using government resources to broker a deal among the cla~ses.~’  Such 
alliances were necessary  to govern successfully America’s large cities.  Ma- 
chines needed working-class votes to win elections. But to govern effectively, 
they depended on the support, or at least the tolerance, of property 
In exchange for their votes, workers received individual benefits, patronage 
jobs, and relief.  At the  same time, machines  wooed  upper-class  voters by 
nominating  prestigious  candidates for major offices  and  by  holding  down 
taxes and municipal debt.33  Here, of course, was the rub. The spending re- 
straint needed to appeal to property  holders came at the expense of  the ma- 
chines’ working-class supporters. 
31. This discussion draws on the work of  Martin Shefter, Political CrisisiFiscal  Crisis (New 
York, 1985); and Steven Erie, Rainbow5 End: lrish Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Ma- 
chine Politics, 1840-1985  (Berkeley, 1988). 
32. Facing the nearly unanimous opposition of  the city’s property holders, with their control 
over investment and the banking system, even San Francisco’s Union Labor Party (ULP) govern- 
ment was forced “to continuously  straddle the line between corporate wishes and a forthright 
defense of the needs of its core constituency. Straining not to cross that line led to inaction, and 
that won the ULP no friends on either side of  the class divide” (Michael Kazin, Barons oflabor: 
The San Francisco Building Trades and Union Power in the Progressive Era [Urbana, 19871, p. 
192). 
33. Jon Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph: City Government in America, 1870-1900  (Balti- 
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Ethnic ties, especially among the Irish, helped political machines navigate 
these difficult shoals. But such ties could not substitute for a program attrac- 
tive  to voters  in  different  economic  circ~mstance.~~  Most  late-nineteenth- 
century machines were led by Irish-Americans.  But constituting less than 20 
percent of  the adult male population in most large cities, the Irish lacked the 
numbers  to dominate  municipal  elections.  Further,  because  they  were  pre- 
dominantly  working  class, the  Irish  controlled  little private  capital.35 And 
even among the Irish, political  appeals based  on ethnicity failed when they 
clashed with workers’ economic interests. In New York in 1886, for example, 
Tammany Hall’s working-class Irish supporters protested the machine’s policy 
of fiscal restraint and opposition to labor militancy by abandoning Tammany 
to support Henry George’s campaign for mayor as the candidate of the radical 
Union Labor Party. 
Neither  wage  workers  nor  property  holders  were  able  to  use  machine- 
dominated  city  governments  to  advance their  interests.  Both  workers  and 
property  holders  accepted  machine  rule only  from fear that the  alternative 
would be open rule by their class enemy. Workers preferred machines to the 
alternative of  elite domination,  even though machines made significant con- 
cessions  to  property  owners. Property  owners  tolerated  machines  because 
they impeded worker militancy and provided protection against socialism. 
Machines like Tammany, therefore,  were a big-city  phenomenon  because 
city property owners feared militant labor enough to tolerate machines. Their 
fear was realistic because in a democratic regime,  working-class majorities 
could make cities dangerous places to hold property. In  1882, for example, 
the New York Times warned that “we are in this City over the crust of a vol- 
cano, with a powerful dangerous class who cares nothing for our property or 
civilization, . . . who burrow at the roots of society, and only come forth . . . 
in  times of  disturbance  to plunder  and prey.”36 Historian  Francis  Parkman 
agreed  that  in  big  cities,  “the  dangerous  classes  are  most  numerous  and 
strong, and the effects  of  flinging  the  suffrage to the  mob are most  disas- 
trous.  . . . Democracy hands over great municipal corporations, the property 
of those who hold stock in them, to the keeping of greedy and irresponsible 
crowds  . . . whose object  is  nothing  but  pl~nder.”~’  Because of  their  high 
proportion  of propertyless  voters, a Harvard professor warned that big cities 
34. Elmer J. Cornwell, Jr., “Bosses, Machines, and Ethnic Groups,’’ Annals of the American 
Academy of Political  and Social Science: City Bosses and Political Machines, 353 (May 1964), 
pp. 27-39;  Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick  Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot  (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1964);  W.  B.  Munro, The Government ofAmerican Cities (New York, 1916). Erie’s Rain- 
bow’s  End provides an alternative view. 
35. Amy Bridges, A City in the Republic: Antebellum New York and the Origins of Machine 
Politics (New York, 1984), discusses the origins of New York’s political machines. 
36. Quoted in David Scobey, “The Class Politics of  City-Building in Gilded Age New York’ 
(manuscript, Brandeis University, Nov. 1988), p. 9. 
37. Francis Parkman, “The Failure of Universal Suffrage,” North American Review, 126 (1878). 
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promoted radicalism: “Urban concentration means . . . that the landless man 
rises  to  supremacy  in  the  voting-lists,  that  the  property-owning  element 
dwindles in relative importance.”38 
Not only were there more workers in larger cities, but their concentration 
facilitated collective action. John Mitchell, head of the United Mine Workers 
of America, argued that unions in small towns were relatively weak because 
workers  in these communities  were  integrated into the broader community. 
Small-town workers then were easily influenced by the hostility of their prop- 
erty-owning neighbors to labor organization. “The wage earners of the indus- 
trial centers,” by contrast, formed “a society of  their own.”  Their neighbor- 
hoods bolstered independent values, incubating and supporting working-class 
militancy.39  As a result, collective action by workers was much more common 
in bigger cities. Not only was union membership more common in big cities, 
but so was strike activity. Strike rates rose with city size; in 1881-86,  the share 
of  the  population  striking  was  nearly  four  times  as high  in  cities of  over 
100,000 than in cities of under 25,000.40 Over the 1881-1900  period, the na- 
tion’s four largest cities, with less than  10  percent  of  the population  of the 
United States, accounted for over half the nation’s strikers and struck estab- 
lishments.41 
Property holders in small towns had  less to fear from labor. The smaller 
scale of  production produced a relatively  smaller working class.  The social 
structure of many  smaller American cities and towns was little changed by 
industrialization.  With  few large establishments,  their industrial  proletariat 
was relatively small, too small to pose a significant political threat. In Massa- 
chusetts towns of under 2,500 in  1885, for example, the average industrial 
establishment had eight workers and only 20 percent of the potential voters 
were wage earners.  In cities of over 5,000 residents, in contrast, the average 
industrial establishment employed 3 1 wage workers and 64 percent of all vot- 
ers were wage earners.  Political patterns reflected these differences in  social 
structure.  Parties supported by the economic elite were strongest in smaller 
communities.  In Massachusetts,  for example, Republicans dominated small 
towns but their vote declined with city size. Independent labor candidates, in 
contrast, increased their vote with city size. In 1884, for example, the Green- 
38. Munro, Government, p. 48. 
39. John  Mitchell,  The Wage Earner and His Problems (Washington, D.C., 1913), p.  152. 
Also note Frank  Parkin, “Working-class Conservatives: A Theory of Political Deviance,” British 
Journal ofSociology, 18 (Sept. 1967), pp. 278-90. 
40. The number of strikers in each of 625 cities with a population over 4,000 is from the U.S. 
Commissioner of Labor, Third Annual Report, 1887 (Washington, D.C.,  1888). City population 
characteristics for these cities are from the U.S. Census Office, Tenrh Census, 1880: Population 
(Washington, D.C.,  1883), vol. 1, part  1, pp. 47-56. 
41. U.S. Commissioner of Labor, Sixteenth Annual Report, 1901 (Washington, D.C., 1902). 
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back-Labor Party gained only 4  percent of the vote in the smallest cities com- 
pared with more than 9 percent in cities of over 5,000. 
It was in the mid-l880s,  the period entitled the “Great Upheaval” by labor 
historians, that the potential threat posed by urban labor came closest to real- 
ization. At the peak of the period’s labor turmoil in 1886, as much as 5 percent 
of the nation’s total labor force was on strike. Conflicts between strikers and 
municipal police combined with anger at fiscal retrenchment to turn these 
industrial actions into political challenges. In  1885 and  1886, independent 
working-class political movements contested elections in  18 percent of cities 
with populations of over 4,000, including most with more than 100,000.42  In 
New  York,  for example, repressive court decisions against strikes and boy- 
cotts and working-class anger at Tammany leader “Honest John” Kelly’s fiscal 
prudence made  the city  in  1886 “ripe for independent political action.”43 
Swollen with new recruits, the city’s unions organized the United Labor Party 
to run Henry George for mayor on a radical labor platform. 
To  defeat George,  Tammany  was  forced to  seek  allies on its right  and 
among the propertied classes. Nominating the manufacturer Abram Hewitt, 
the candidate of its long-time rivals organized as the County Democracy, Tam- 
many defeated George with a fusion campaign, appealing to conservative vot- 
ers “for the saving of society.”44  The George candidacy in New York attracted 
the most attention, but in the same year candidates supported by trade unions 
and the Knights of Labor also ran strong races in other large cities, including 
Milwaukee and Chicago. As in New York, these challenges were blocked by 
a united front of bourgeois defense, organized “to save the city government 
from capture by the ‘Reds’  .”45 
The Great Upheaval demonstrated anew to urban politicians the need for a 
strategy to accommodate property owners without alienating labor voters. 
Machines like Tammany developed tighter, more centralized organizations to 
restrain popular revolts.& Organization gave the machine’s central leadership 
the tools to punish grass-root revolts. But even the best organization depended 
on policies that gave both workers and property holders a stake in the ma- 
chine’s success. Machines provided these with public works. 
42. This is from a coding of the cities in Leon Fink, Workingmen’s  Democracy: The Knights of 
Labor and American Politics (Urbana, 1983). pp. 28-29,  matched with population data for 625 
cities with a population of over 4,000.  The population data are from the U.S. Census Office, Tenth 
Census, 1880: Population, vol. 1,  part 1,  pp. 47-56. 
43. Gustavus Myers, The History of  Tammany Hall (New York,  1917), p. 269. Also see Martin 
Shefter, “The Electoral Foundations of the Political Machine,” in History of  American Electoral 
Behavior, Joel Silbey, Allan Bogue, and William Flanigan, eds. (Princeton, 1978). p. 290. 
44. Hewitt won only with the support of many Republican voters who deserted their own can- 
didate, future president Theodore Roosevelt. Tammany did not depend on such support but also 
used frauds “so glaring and so tremendous in the aggregate’’ that most supporters of  George be- 
lieved their candidate won only to be “counted out” (Myers, History of  Tammany Hall, p. 270). 
45. Ralph Schamau, “Thomas J. Morgan and the United Labor Party of Chicago,” Journal of 
the Illinois State Historical Society, 66 (Spring 1974). pp. 5 1-54. 
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The American tradition  of  using public works to reward supporters has a 
long history. As early as the 1830s, Democrats and Whigs solicited votes with 
jobs on canal and highway project~.~’  Public works spending can be the ideal 
cement for a cross-class political coalition. Such spending provides working- 
class jobs, which in turn enhances property  values and rents of landowners, 
and  it creates educational, recreational,  transportation,  and health  facilities 
for middle-class use.48  As a result, and in contrast with welfare measures ben- 
efiting exclusively workers and the unemployed, support for capital improve- 
ments spans the class divide. Even in San Francisco, where middle-class and 
working-class voters between  1899 and  1910 agreed on little else, both ap- 
proved ten bond issues to build schools, hospitals, parks, sewers, and railroad 
and water systems by nearly identical three-to-one margins.49 
Late-nineteenth-century political machines embarked on a jamboree of city 
building. Because of the economies of scale that come with a relatively dense 
population,  per  capita expenditures  on road,  waterworks,  sewer,  park,  and 
public  building  construction  should decline  with city size. Instead,  around 
1890, cities of over 100,000 spent 55 percent more per capita on these facili- 
ties than  did those  of  10,000 to 15,000. Built by  workers  but used almost 
exclusively by the upper classes, park improvements demonstrate most clearly 
how political machines established cross-class coalitions. By  1890, cities of 
more than  100,000 had spent over eight times the amount on park improve- 
ments than  had the smallest cities and over four times  as much as cities of 
50,000 to 100,000.50  Through public works, political machines supplied the 
propertied classes with public goods and gave workers jobs and wages without 
class struggle. 
Big-city political  machines did not rely exclusively on municipal Keynes- 
ianism  to  gain  working-class  support.  They  also  consciously  undermined 
working-class  solidarity  by  favoring  selected  elements  of  organized  labor. 
Craft unions were their preferred allies.  Alliances with radical unions orga- 
nized along working-class lines, such as the Knights of Labor or the Interna- 
tional Workers of the World, would frighten all property holders because these 
unions  challenged  the  system  of  private  property,  threatening  all  property 
holders regardless of industry. In contrast,  an alliance with craft unions was 
47.  See, for example, Erie, Rainbow’s End, p. 12. 
48.  While constituting only about 10 percent of the American labor force in  1900,  Irish-born 
workers were 19 percent of  the labor force in four construction trades in the ten largest cities; see 
U.S. Department of  Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census, Special Reports: Occupations 
at the Tweljrh Census (Washington. D.C., 1904),  pp. 64,488-715. 
49.  Erie, Rainbow’s End, p. 82. 
SO.  There is an  interesting contrast between the relatively heavy per capita expenditures on 
public facilities in big cities with the relatively low expenditures on private business recreation. 
Theaters and other private recreational facilities were more available per capita in smaller cities. 
See the U.S. Department of the Interior, Census Office, Report on the Social Srarisrics of Cities, 
at rhe Eleventh Census: I890 (Washington, D.C., 189S),  pp. IS-47. 461  Urban Politics and Big-City Construction 
less threatening because craft unions consciously rejected class alliances and 
restricted their concerns to a part of the working class without challenging the 
basic organization of society. 
In Chicago, for example, municipal government favored construction craft 
unions while they used the police to repress broader working-class solidarity. 
Carter Harrison I, Chicago’s mayor for most of the 188Os, was openly allied 
with the city’s conservative craft unions. Through the early and mid-l880s, 
he hired Trades Assembly leaders for city positions and restrained the city’s 
police force during  strike^.^' This alliance did not stop him from crushing the 
city’s Knights of Labor and Central Labor Union after May Day  1886 and the 
Haymarket Affair. Drawing on contributions from Marshall Field and three 
hundred other prominent citizens, the city’s police used the Haymarket Affair 
as an excuse to attack Chicago’s radical  labor movement. Union  meetings 
were banned, halls closed, records confiscated, and leaders hauled off  to po- 
lice stations for questioning, or worse. 
The post-Haymarket repression may have hurt all of Chicago’s unions, but 
it was  most damaging to the anarchist and radical industrial unions and the 
Knights of Labor, who were the focus of police repression. Once these unions 
were defeated, the city’s Democratic politicians and conservative craft unions 
quickly renewed an alliance that both had found advantageous. On one side, 
the experience of police repression demonstrated forcefully to craft unions the 
importance of maintaining political support for their activities, and the surge 
of  independent labor politics in 1886 and 1887 convinced Democratic politi- 
cians that  they  needed to  cultivate alliances to hold  onto elements of  the 
working-class electorate. To  preempt further independent labor politics, Chi- 
cago’s Democratic machine consciously sought allies among construction 
craft unions. At the behest of these unions, the Democratically controlled City 
Council on 8 June 1889 adopted an eight-hour ordinance drafted by  Clarence 
Darrow for city construction. The City Council’s action was soon copied by 
the city’s School Board and the Cook County Board of  County Commission- 
er~.~*  Construction unions responded to these overtures and the Carpenters 
Union quickly endorsed the Democratic candidate for reelection in 1889. The 
alliance gave the Democratic machine leverage to undermine independent po- 
litical action by organized labor. To protect their alliance with the Democrats, 
the Carpenters sabotaged a campaign by  other unions (including the city’s 
machinists’ union) to renew the city’s Union Labor Party in 1890. Observers 
said the carpenters feared that independent political action by  labor “would 
exasperate the Democratic city administration and bring on the active opposi- 
tion of the City Hall officials and the police” right before the Carpenter’s major 
5 1. Bruce Nelson, Beyond the Martyrs: A Social History of  Chicago’s  Anarchists, 1870-1900 
52. Richard Schneirov and Thomas J. Suhrbur, Union Brotherhood,  Union Town: The History 
(New Brunswick,  1988), p. 43. 
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eight-hour day campaign in 1890.53  To  maintain their alliance with the Dem- 
ocratic machine, Chicago’s Carpenters abandoned working-class solidarity. 
Chicago’s construction unions profited from this alliance. By  1900, when 
Carter Harrison’s son was mayor, there were twenty-two building trades union 
leaders on the city payroll, including the head of Chicago’s Building Trades 
Council who also headed the city’s Civil Service Board. Many union leaders 
served as city building  inspectors  and  supervised the  employers they dealt 
with over the bargaining table and during strikes. Chicago’s city government 
openly  favored  unions  during  labor disputes.  During a major  construction 
lockout in 1900, for example, contractors and their strikebreakers were denied 
basic police protection and were forced to hire five hundred special detectives 
to guard their building  One employer denounced the protection their 
plants  received  from police  as a “farce”  and  blamed their troubles on city 
hall’s twenty-two “laboring men.”55  His problem, however, was not the union- 
ists in city hall, some of whom were there in 1886 as well, but the tight alli- 
ance that  had  been  formed since the Great  Upheaval between  construction 
craft unions and the Democratic machine. 
Political  machines,  like Chicago’s, helped  their construction union  allies 
outside of strikes. Workers employed on public construction, including utili- 
ties and workers at the 1893 Chicago World’s Fair, were shielded from labor 
market competition by municipal regulations setting wages and working con- 
ditions at union levels.  State support made these  “good jobs,”  preferred  to 
other  private  employments and  obtained  only  through  personal  influence. 
Control over such employment gave unions and political  machines leverage 
over  workers  and  voters.  Personalized  administration  gave  municipal  offi- 
cials, including  building  inspectors,  opportunities  to grant  favor or  “petty 
penalties and annoyances” to employers, discretion they used to harass anti- 
union businesses and building contractors with unfavorable tax assessments, 
building and safety inspections, or by withholding authorization to use public 
ways. In San Francisco, under Boss Reuf’s rule, for example, open-shop con- 
tractors and employers battled repeated attempts by municipal departments to 
hamper their operations  with  petty citations and bureaucratic delays.  Many 
agreed to operate union  shops out of  fear that a city inspector would close 
them down 
With open city support, construction unions boomed in Chicago even while 
manufacturing-sector unions made little headway. Machines rarely formed al- 
liances with unions outside of the building trades, partly because alliances the 
machines made with construction unions reduced their need for alliances with 
other unions. The machines also had more to offer unions in the construction 
53. Chicago Tribune (1 June 1890), p. 6. 
54.  Royal Montgomery, Industrial Relations in the Chicago Building Trades (Chicago, 1927), 
55. David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), p. 272. 
56. Michael Kazin, Barons oflabor, p. 188. 
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sector than in manufacturing. While manufacturing employers could shift lo- 
cation to avoid unfriendly local governments, construction was fixed to partic- 
ular locations.  Tied to particular  locations and schedules, construction con- 
tractors were particularly vulnerable to local action by city governments and 
workers. As the Illinois governor and social reformer J. P.  Altgeld observed, 
building trades unions could achieve gains that eluded others because con- 
struction “is always a local q~estion.”~’ 
Regardless  of  location,  technical  conditions  helped  make  construction 
workers throughout the United States, and the world, among the most union- 
ized of workers.58  But it was political support that made large cities American 
construction  unionism’s  stronghold.  The  New  York  correspondent  of  the 
business-oriented Boston Evening Transcript reported in 1892 that “it is only 
in the building trades that the labor unions in New York have of late retained 
much power for evil. There they are a constant bane.”59 While probably ex- 
aggerating the weakness of other unions, this was an accurate assessment of 
the strength of unionism in the construction trades, both in New York and in 
other large American cities. 
16.4  Conclusion: Wages and Politics in Large American Cities 
Construction  workers  played  a central  role  in  American  radical  politics 
from the  1770s through the  1830s, the  1850s, and the  1880~.~  Among the 
leaders of Philadelphia’s Order of United American Mechanics, for example, 
were George F. Turner, carpenter, John Bottsford, bricklayer, and Matthew W. 
Robinson, carpenter.61  Later building tradesmen joined workers from outside 
the building trades to support radical political action in the Great Upheaval of 
the 1880~.~*  Peter McGuire, carpenter, founder of the American Federation of 
Labor and of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, for example, 
was a Lassallian socialist and organizer for the Socialist Labor Party. Under 
his leadership, the Carpenters at their first national convention endorsed inde- 
pendent  working-class  political  action  and  industrial  unionism.63 Radical 
building tradesmen joined alliances structured according to their relationship 
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to property rights, uniting all those whose only productive property was their 
labor. 
As long as construction workers had the same relationship to the state and 
the  legal  system  as  did  other  workers,  there  were  grounds  for a  broad, 
working-class  alliance. The active role of  local officials in construction  and 
their support for construction unions and workers,  however, made construc- 
tion workers a privileged part of  the working class. Treated differently by the 
state, construction workers had reason to distance themselves from the rest of 
the working class. 
Focusing on national politics, scholars comparing American and European 
unions have stressed differences between politicized European central union 
federations and their relatively apolitical American counterparts. By neglect- 
ing  local  action, however,  these  studies overlook  much  of  American  craft 
unions’ political action. Craft unions were generally uninterested in national 
legislation, but this did not preclude an active involvement in local politics.64 
American craft unions understood well the importance of government policy, 
but living in a decentralized regime they sought to influence local politics. Far 
from not  being  conscious of  their  position  as  wage  earners, construction 
workers were extraordinarily  active in defense of  their interests against their 
employers. And far from being apolitical, they were intimately involved in 
But their militancy and their political action did not leadto alliances 
with other workers because they found they could advance their interests-at 
least  their  short-run interests-better  through  alliances  with  local political 
machines resting on cross-class coalitions. 
In cross-class alliances with urban political machines,  construction unions 
used America’s political system to their advantage. But their cross-class alli- 
ances weakened any working-class challenge to capitalist domination.  Allied 
with  local  Republican  or  Democratic  machines,  construction  unions  sup- 
ported the AFL’s voluntarist ideology because it required no commitment on 
political issues that might upset their local alliances.% Construction workers 
became  the crucial missing  component to  any  socialist  political  coalition. 
Without  them  America’s  big  cities  and  its  working  class were  lost  to  so- 
cialism. 
Through  alliances  with  political  machines,  construction  unions  carved a 
niche for themselves within the existing political and social order. Secure in 
their urban fortresses, construction  workers were labor’s aristocrats,  able to 
stand on their own and for themselves. 
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